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Class Warfare:
Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential for
Compensation and Deterrence
BY ROBERT H. LANDE

O

UR RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES
demonstrate five reasons why antitrust class
action cases are essential: (1) class actions are
virtually the only way for most victims of
antitrust violations to receive compensation;
(2) most successful class actions involve collusion that was
anticompetitive; (3) class victims’ compensation has been
modest, generally less than their damages; (4) class actions
deter significant amounts of collusion and other anticompetitive behavior; and (5) anticompetitive collusion is underdeterred, a problem that would be exacerbated without class
actions.
Recent court decisions undermine class action cases, thus
preventing much effective and important antitrust enforcement.1

Class Actions Are Virtually the Only Way for
Most Victims of Federal Antitrust Violations to
Receive Compensation
The antitrust statutes provide that violations result in automatic treble damages for the victims.2 The legislative history 3 and case law indicate that compensation of victims is a
goal, perhaps the dominant goal, of antitrust law’s damages
remedy.4 Class actions play an essential role in ensuring that
the treble damages remedy serves its intended function of
“protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price
fixing.” 5 As the Supreme Court noted, “[C]lass actions . . .
may enhance the efficacy of private [antitrust] actions by
permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to
achieve a more powerful litigation posture.” 6 Accordingly,
“courts have repeatedly found antitrust claims to be particularly well suited for class actions . . . .” 7
Without class actions, cartels and other antitrust violators
that inflict widespread economic harm would have little to
Rober t H. Lande is Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law and is a Director of the American Antitrust Institute. The
author thanks Neil W. Averitt, John M. Connor, and Joshua P. Davis for
extremely helpful comments, and H.C. Jones III and Alexander Powell for
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fear from the treble damages remedy. This is because, as a
practical matter, class action cases are virtually the only way
for most victims of anticompetitive behavior to receive compensation.8 A 2013 study that Professor Joshua Davis and I
conducted documents the benefits of private enforcement by
analyzing 60 of the largest recent successful private U.S.
antitrust cases (defined as suits resolved since 1990 that recovered at least $50 million in cash for the victims 9 ). These
actions returned a total of $33.8–$35.8 billion in cash to victims of anticompetitive behavior.10 These figures do not
include products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive relief or precedent—only cash.11 Consequently, these
totals significantly understate the actual benefits of this litigation to the victims involved. And, of course, this study covered only 60 suits (albeit 60 of the largest private recoveries)
out of the many hundreds of private cases filed in the United
States during this period.
Of these 60 large private cases, 49 were class action suits.12
These cases recovered a total of $19.4–$21.0 billion—the
majority of the amount analyzed in our study.13 Since these
were among the largest private actions ever filed, specific
conclusions based upon these results may not generalize perfectly to all class action cases. They do suggest, however, that
without class action cases, effective and significant victim
compensation would be reduced dramatically.
Most Successful Class Actions Involve Collusion
that Was Anticompetitive
Almost every private antitrust case that results in a remedy
does so through a settlement,14 so the underlying merits of
the plaintiffs’ claims usually have not been definitively
assessed by a court or jury. Critics sometimes use this fact to
support assertions that class actions usually are meritless, that
plaintiffs often receive huge sums from cases not involving
anticompetitive conduct, and that private antitrust actions
often amount to legalized blackmail or extortion.15
Antitrust class actions arise in widely varied market and
factual settings, and views about the merits of specific cases
and the litigation risks involved vary as well. This makes it
extremely difficult to draw objective conclusions about the
merits of settlements.
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Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the
vast majority of class action cases in the Davis/Lande study
involved legitimate claims. Forty-one of the 49 class actions
involved allegations of collusion,16 and the same conduct
supporting the settlements gave rise to criminal penalties in
20 cases; to civil relief by the FTC or DOJ in 8 cases; to civil
relief by a state or other governmental unit in 9 cases; to a trial
that the defendants lost and that was not overturned on
appeal in 7 cases; to a class being certified in 22 cases; and to
plaintiffs surviving or prevailing at summary judgment in 12
cases.17 Overall, 44 of the 49 class action suits (90 percent)
exhibited at least one of these forms of legal validation as to
their merits. (The 5 actions that did not have at least one of
these indicia settled too early for a substantive evaluation of
their merits).18
These results are broadly consistent with a finding that
Professor John Connor derived from an analysis of 130 private recoveries worldwide in international cartel cases for
which he could obtain the necessary data.19 He found that of
the 50 largest worldwide settlements, measured by their monetary recoveries in constant dollars, 49 had been filed against
international cartels.20 Of these, 51 percent were follow-ups
to successful DOJ prosecutions, and another 8 percent were
filed after fines by the EC or other non-U.S. antitrust authorities.21 Using a different data set, Connor and I found that
36 of 71 (also 51 percent) successful U.S. class action recoveries followed successful DOJ criminal cases.22
This data does not prove that these or any other specific
class action cases involved anticompetitive conduct. But critics who assert that most antitrust class actions are little more
than legalized blackmail rely only on anecdotes, hypotheticals, and opinions (often of defendants in the cases), without
support from studies, and with no reliable empirical evidence that the actions lack merit or that settlement amounts
are excessive compared to the anticompetitive harm.23 To be
fair, one should compare the above indicia of validity to the
absence of any systematic evidence underpinning the critics’
charges.
Critics also sometimes assert that remedies typically
secured in class action settlements are at best dubious and
often are completely worthless, consisting of useless coupons,
meaningless discounts, and obsolete products. They argue
with regard to cash payments (without providing even a single anecdote) that “issuing [class members] a check is often
so expensive that administrative costs swallow the entire
recovery.” 24 According to many critics the only ones to benefit from private enforcement are the attorneys involved.25
The critics who make these charges, however, never offer
evidence beyond opinions, hypotheticals, and occasional
anecdotes. Indeed, for the 49 antitrust class action cases that
Davis and I studied, the data show that, overall, only a total
of approximately 20 percent of the recoveries went for attorney fees (14.3 percent) or claims administration expenses
(4.1 percent).26 The rest was returned to the victims. This
result is consistent with older estimates of legal fees in
8 2
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antitrust class action cases in the 6.5 to 21 percent range.27
Critics also sometimes examine what happened in other
areas of law and assert that these outcomes occur in contemporary antitrust class action suits as well. But they never
offer systematic evidence from antitrust cases to support their
opinions.28 Interestingly, only one of the lawsuits in the
Davis/Lande study involved a coupon remedy—the Auction
Houses cases. However, those coupons were fully redeemable
for cash if they were not used for five years.29
The actions Davis and I studied were among the largest
antitrust class actions ever brought and therefore might not
be representative of class action cases in general. Abuses surely occur from time to time in class action cases, as they do
almost everywhere in the legal system. But a majority of the
critics’ most egregious examples are from other areas of law
or are quite old.30 No one has ever presented reliable evidence
showing that such examples occur frequently or are typical of
contemporary antitrust class action cases.31
Class Victims’ Compensation Has Been Modest,
Generally Less than Their Damages
Even though the $19.4–$21.0 billion that Davis and I
showed had been returned to victims in 49 class action cases
is a significant figure when viewed in absolute terms, it probably was not nearly enough to fully compensate all of the victims involved.
To ascertain “Recovery Ratios” (the percentage of the illegal overcharges that was obtained in the form of monetary
payments to victims in private actions), Professor Connor
and I assembled a sample consisting of every completed private case against cartels discovered from 1990 to mid-2014
for which we could find the necessary information. For each
of these 71 cases we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of
affected commerce and overcharges and compared these estimates to the damages secured in the private actions filed
against these cartels.32
The victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20 percent)
recovered their damages (or more) in settlement. Only seven
(10 percent) received more than double damages. The rest—
the victims in 57 cases—received less than their damages. In
four cases, the victims received less than 1 percent of damages, and in 12 cases they received less than 10 percent of
damages. Overall, the median average settlement was 37 percent of single damages. The unweighted mean settlement (a
figure that gives equal weights to the cartels that operated in
large and small markets) was 66 percent. The mean and
median average Recovery Ratios are higher (81 percent and
52 percent, respectively), for the 36 cases that were follow-ups
to DOJ prosecutions that imposed criminal sanctions.33
Because these Recovery Ratios do not include any valuations of products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive relief or precedent, the actual worth of these remedies to
the victims is greater than the figures reported above.
Nevertheless, it fairly can be concluded that antitrust class
action cases often return important recoveries to victims that

are significant in absolute terms, but usually are modest when
measured against the sizes of the overcharges involved.
Class Actions Deter Significant Amounts of
Collusion and Other Anticompetitive Behavior
Private class action cases serve to deter a substantial amount
of anticompetitive activity, perhaps even more than the highly acclaimed anti-cartel program of the U.S. Department of
Justice, which often results in prison sentences for cartel participants.34
Virtually every contemporary analysis of antitrust enforcement assumes that deterrence is an important purpose of the
private treble damages remedy provision.35 The Supreme
Court has underscored this point. For example, in Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., the Court explained:
Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to
antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant
supplement to the limited resources available to the
Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and
deterring violations.36

The government, however, cannot be expected to do all of
the necessary enforcement for a number of reasons, including budgetary constraints, “undue fear of losing cases; lack of
awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views
about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were in fact victims of
anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; and the unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions are, at times, politically motivated.” 37
A recent study highlights the deterrence benefits of private
enforcement by comparing the likely deterrent effects of private antitrust enforcement to that of criminal anti-cartel
enforcement by the Antitrust Division.38 The surprising result
is that private enforcement—and even just antitrust class
action cases considered separately—probably deters more
anticompetitive behavior.
From 1990 through 2011 the total of DOJ corporate
antitrust fines, individual fines, and restitution payments
totaled $8.2 billion. (Dis)valuing a year of prison or house
arrest at $6 million 39 adds another $3.6 billion in total deterrence from the DOJ’s anti-cartel cases, yielding a total of
approximately $11.8 billion.
This is a substantial figure, and the possibility of incurring
such sanctions surely has deterred a significant number of
would-be antitrust violators.40 Nevertheless, these penalties
amount to approximately 50 percent of the $19.4–$21.0
billion in cash alone (not including products, etc.) secured by
just the 49 studied class cases that were completed during the
same period.41 These private cases were only a portion of the
hundreds of successful class action cases completed during
this period (albeit they were many of the largest).42 The total
amount of payouts in class action cases is so high that it
probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than even the
DOJ’s anti-cartel enforcement efforts.

Anticompetitive Collusion Is Underdeterred,
A Problem that Would Be Exacerbated
Without Class Actions
Some critics assert that “treble damages, along with other
remedies, can overdeter some conduct that may not be anticompetitive . . . .” 43 Yet, despite the request by the Antitrust
Modernization Commission for evidence on this issue,44
“[n]o actual cases or evidence of systematic overdeterrence
were presented to the Commission . . . .” 45
By contrast, in a recent study, John Connor and I analyzed
whether the current level of antitrust enforcement against cartels (the source of most class action cases) was optimal in
achieving deterrence.46 The United States imposes a diverse
array of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for firms, and prison terms, house arrest,
and fines for corporate officials. Both direct and indirect victims can sue for mandatory treble damages and attorneys’
fees. This multiplicity of sanctions has helped give rise to the
strongly held—but until recently never seriously examined—
conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that these sanctions are not merely adequate, but are probably excessive.47
Our study analyzed this issue using the standard optimal
deterrence methodology.48 This approach is predicated upon
the belief that corporations and individuals contemplating
illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected rewards are
less than expected costs, adjusted by the probability the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned.49 The study first
calculated the expected rewards from cartelization using a
unique data base containing information concerning 75 cartel cases. The study surveyed the literature to ascertain the
probability that cartels are detected and the probability that
detected cartels are sanctioned, and calculated the size of the
sanctions involved for each case. These sanctions include
corporate fines, individual fines, payouts in private damage
actions, and the equivalent value (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house arrest for convicted individuals (using $6 million per year).50
The analysis showed that, overall, combined U.S. cartel
sanctions are only 9 to 21 percent as large as they should be
to deter anticompetitive collusion optimally. This means that
despite the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational
business strategy, and that cartelization is a crime that, on
average, pays. In fact, it pays very well. Cartel underdeterrence is a severe problem today, and without class action
cases the extent of this underdeterrence would be substantially worse.51
Conclusion
There is an almost-unanimous consensus in the antitrust
world that the DOJ’s anti-cartel enforcement record is exemplary.52 In terms of benefits generated, taxpayer dollars are
well spent.
Antitrust class action cases, in contrast, get little respect
and much criticism, with critics asserting that antitrust class
actions are usually not in the public interest.53 This critical
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view may help explain the large number of judicial decisions
that have made it more difficult for victims of anticompetitive conduct, and especially those victims with limited
resources, to recover significant portions of their overcharges
and, at times, have prevented any recovery whatsoever.54 In
light of the crucial role that antitrust class action recoveries
play in compensating victims of illegal activity and deterring
anticompetitive behavior, these cases should be encouraged
rather than hampered through restrictive judicial interpretations of the applicable law.䡵
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Much of the analysis in this article derives from the cited portions of Joshua
P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 G A . L. R EV. 1, 11–16, 33–38 (2013)
[hereinafter Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom], http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217051; John M. Connor &
Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34
C ARDOZO L. R EV. 427, 431 (2012) [hereinafter Connor & Lande, Crime
Pays], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217051;
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries
Are Mostly Less than Single Damages, 100 I OWA L. R EV. 1997 (2015) [hereinafter Connor & Lande, Cartel Recoveries], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548712; Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande,
Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 S EATTLE U. L. R EV. 1269, 1280 (2013) [hereinafter Davis &
Lande, Empirical Assessment], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2132981; Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from
Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U. S.F. L. R EV.
879 (2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits], http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Victims also receive reasonable attorneys’ fees.
This section is partly drawn from Connor & Lande, Cartel Recoveries, supra
note 1.
In the legislative debates Senator Coke complained about a bill that would
have provided only for double damages: “How would a citizen who has been
plundered in his family consumption of sugar by the sugar trust . . . recover his damages under that clause? It is simply an impossible remedy
offered him . . . . [H]ow could the consumers of the articles produced by
these trusts, the great mass of our people—the individuals—go about
showing the damages they had suffered? How would they establish the damage which they had sustained so as to get a judgment under this bill? I do
not believe they could do it. ” 21 C ONG . R EC . 2615 (1890). Representative
Webb stated that the damages provision “opens the door of justice in
every man whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust
laws and gives the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.”
51 C O N G . R E C . 9073 (1914). He also stated that “we are liberalizing the
procedure in the courts in order to give the individual who is damaged the
right to get his damages anywhere—anywhere you can catch the offender
. . . .” 51 C ONG . R EC . 16,274 (1914).
See generally John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 N OTRE D AME
L. R EV. 191, 211–27 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1113927 (discussing case law). The decision of Congress to
award “treble damages” certainly could be explained by congressional
intent that two-thirds of antitrust damages were intended not to compensate
victims, but for some other purpose—such as deterrence. It is possible,
however, that some or all of the “extra” damages were intended to compensate victims for harms not covered by the statutory damages remedy,
such as prejudgment interest, the value of victims’ time expended pursuing their litigation, the cost to the victims of the disruptions caused by
antitrust violations, and also for broader market effects that are difficult to
quantify, such as the allocative inefficiencies and umbrella effects that flow
from the exercise of market power.
If the purpose of the damages remedy is compensation, the “damages”
caused by an antitrust violation should consist of the sum of all relatively
predictable harms caused by that violation affecting anyone other than the
defendants. Damages should include the wealth transferred from con-
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sumers to the violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects felt
by society, whether caused directly, or indirectly via “umbrella” effects, or to
indirect purchasers of the products or services in question. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, the value of the plaintiffs’ time spent pursuing the case, the
costs of disruption to the victims due to the antitrust violation, and the costs
to taxpayers of the judicial system also should be included. See Robert H.
Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 O HIO S T.
L.J. 115, 161–68 (1993), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1134822. Indeed, when these factors are considered, nominal
“treble damages”—even on those rare occasions when they are actually
awarded 4—are really only approximately single damages. Id., passim.
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (explaining in footnote 6 that “the treble-damages remedy of § 4 took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23”).
See Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972).
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.D.C.
2001).
Government enforcers can bring disgorgement actions, but these are not
common. For an overview of the relevant issues, see Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Withdraws Agency’s Policy Statement on Monetary
Remedies in Competition Cases; Will Rely on Existing Law (July 31, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/07/ftc-withdrawsagencys-policy-statement-monetary-remedies. For an excellent analysis of
this area, see Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76
A NTITRUST L.J. 501 (2009). See also In re Mylan, 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C.
2002). In addition, state attorneys general can bring actions on behalf of
their citizens when they are victims of antitrust violations. See, e.g., Hawaii
v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. at 266; Robert H. Lande, New Options for
State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust
Violations, 61 A LA . L. R EV. 447 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267202. For example, in Tricor Antitrust Litigation,
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 580 F. Supp. 2d 345
(D. Del. 2008), a group of states recovered $22 million, and private plaintiffs recovered $316 million. For an analysis of this case, see Joshua P.
Davis & Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private
Antitrust Enforcement (Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No.
2013-01, Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Davis & Lande, Summaries], http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961669, at 75–79.
Most of the studied cases settled, so it would be more accurate to describe
plaintiffs as “alleged victims.” However, the majority of these cases were follow-ups to successful government enforcement actions or involved a civil
verdict, so in these cases the term “victims” is likely to be especially appropriate. See infra text accompanying notes 16–22.
See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 1, at 890–91. These figures are
expressed in 2011 dollars.
See Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at 16; see,
e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503,
511–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting “injunctive relief will result in future savings
to the Class valued from approximately $25 to $87 billion or more,” while
compensatory relief was valued at $3.38 billion). The value of the recoveries did include attorneys’ fees. Id. at 892 n.46.
This statistic was calculated from Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies
42 U.S.F. L. R EV. 879 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1105523 [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies], and
Davis & Lande, Summaries, supra note 8, passim.
The rest of the cases were brought by competitors or large victims. Calculated from Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 1, at 892, 902, and Davis
& Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 1, at 1287.
This section is partly based on Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom,
supra note 1, at 15–22 and 33–38.
See Connor & Lande, Cartel Recoveries, supra note 1, at 1999–2002
(almost every successful antitrust case settles, and 99 percent of antitrust
cases settle or are dismissed).
This statistic was calculated from Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra
note 12, passim, and Davis & Lande, Summaries, supra note 11, passim.
Most of the studied cases settled, so it would be more accurate to describe
the collusion as “alleged.” However, the majority of these cases were follow-ups to successful government cartel enforcement actions or involved a
civil verdict, so in these cases the term “collusion” is likely to be especially appropriate. See text accompanying notes 19–25 infra.
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In addition, in the 16 class action cases where we thought to look for it,
we found six where plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss. See Davis &
Lande, Summaries, supra note 8, passim.
These statistics were calculated from Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies,
supra note 12, and Davis & Lande, Summaries, supra note 8.
See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries in International Cartel Cases
Worldwide: What Do the Data Show? A NTITRUST C HRON . 2 (Dec. 2012), at
2–24 [hereinafter Connor, Private Recoveries).
Id.
See id. at 10–11 (footnotes omitted) (“The proportion of private cases following earlier U.S. government sanctions is 51% of the total private actions
in the sample. . . . Second , a somewhat unappreciated fact is that 8% of
U.S. private actions are filed after fines by the EC or other non-U.S. antitrust
authorities. . . . Examples include two of the smaller bulk Vitamins products
(B12 and Canthaxanthin), Methionine, Acrylic Glass, and Flat Glass. All but
one of these cases is [a] global cartel. In some instances, the DOJ investigated the cartel but chose not to indict, while in other instances there is
no public information that the DOJ formally investigated the cartel. Third,
41% of the treble-damages cases were non-follow-on.”).
See Connor & Lande, Cartel Recoveries, supra note 1, at 1997.
See Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at 38–78
(especially the material presenting and analyzing the criticisms of antitrust
class action cases offered by three of the nation’s leading antitrust scholars: Professors Cavanagh, Crane, and Page).
See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. R EV. 675,
682–83 (2010).
See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 1, at 883–89.
This is a weighted average. If an unweighted average were used the total
would be roughly 30%. See Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom,
supra note 1, at 46–49.
See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private
Antitrust Litigation, 74 G EO. L.J. 1001, 25 (1986) (“Though the data are
sparse, the award data from the Georgetown sample indicates that the
[legal fee] cost ratio in in the range of 10%–20% [of plaintiff recoveries] in
cases in which awards were made.”).
See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 1, at 883–89.
See Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 12, at 14. We did not
count these coupons when we assessed the benefits of this litigation;
we considered only the cash recovery.
See e.g., Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at
43–45 (presenting and analyzing the criticisms of private class action
cases offered by Professor Page in 2011 that were based upon a 1988
study that was not antitrust-specific, and the 2010 criticisms offered by
Professor Crane that were based solely upon an unsupported 1969 statement by Richard Posner).
See Davis & Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at 17–22.
See Connor & Lande, Cartel Recoveries, supra note 1, at 1997. For a number of qualifications and definitions, see id., passim, including the caveat
that we did not attempt to value coupons, products, discounts, or injunctive
relief.
Id. These recovery amounts include attorneys’ fees.
See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from
Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
2011 B.Y.U. L. R EV. 315 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1565693&download=yes [hereinafter Lande & Davis,
Comparative Deterrence].
Indeed, some believe that deterrence is the sole purpose of the remedy provisions. For citations, see William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Violations, 50 U. C HI . L. R EV. 652, 656 (1983); Connor & Lande, Crime
Pays, supra note 1, at 431; and Lande, Treble Damages, supra note 4, at
124–29. In the Sherman Act debates, Representative Webb stated, “Under
the civil remedies any man throughout the United States, hundreds and
thousands, can bring suit in the various jurisdictions and thus the offender
will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to take money out
of his pocket.” 51 C ONG . R EC . 16,275 (1914). See the discussion of these
debates in Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 M ICH . L.
R EV. 1, 21–30 (1989). See also Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel
Regimes, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc346.pdf, at 52–53 (2005) (multilateral survey of antitrust authorities
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noting that deterrence is the primary or exclusive objective of cartel sanctions).
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979). See also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985)
(“The treble-damages provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool
in the antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential violators.”); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S.
143, 151 (1987) (Clayton Act “bring[s] to bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial
resources are deemed inadequate”).
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